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INTRODUCTION:

The process of implementing the law through administrative
rulemaking affects nearly every sector of society-from government to
businesses and industry, from professional groups to citizens. Stakeholders
in administrative regulation are ubiquitous, but each is unique, representing
many different interests and values and desiring many different outcomes.
Appeasing thege stakeholders presents a seemingly insurmountable
challenge accompanied by controversy and frustration. The administrative
rulemaking process in North Carolina has engendered much contempt
during the past several decades,' and repeated attempts at regulatory reform
have done little but stoke the coals of an already fiery debate. In the
middle of the debate surrounding the rulemaking process is the Rules
Review Commission ("RRC").
1. See Sabra Faires, The Chair's Comments, ADMIN. LAW. (N.C. Bar Ass'n), Oct. 1995, at
1 (noting the various failed attempts at creating rulemaking systems and the negative

repercussions for stakeholders).
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The RRC is the legislatively created body responsible for reviewing
rules formulated by administrative agencies. Under current law, the RRC
determines the limits of statutory authority granted to agencies, objects to
administrative rules that fail to meet three statutorily mandated criteria, and
further, vetoes administrative rules proposed by agencies. The RRC's
authority raises concern about the constitutionality of the commission;
specifically, whether the RRC's authority constitutes a violation of the
separation of powers principle expressly articulated in the North Carolina
Constitution.' In addition, the authority claimed by the RRC raises several
important public policy concerns. Former North Carolina Commissioner of
Labor, and member of the RRC, Harry Payne expressed the fear felt by
many state agencies and individuals as to the authority possessed by the
RRC:
The [RRC] will be asked to pass upon rules about heavy metals in
fish flesh, cadmium exposure in the workplace, conductive hearing
loss and the appropriate space between beds in migrant housing to
avoid the spread of tuberculosis. With practically no review of their
decision to veto, the members of the Rules Review Commission
wield more power than most elected officials.3
The role of the RRC in the rulemaking process is the fulcrum of the
debate over the regulatory process in North Carolina. On one side of the
debate, state administrative agencies and stakeholder groups are frustrated
by the inordinate delay required for a rule to move through the review
process and take effect. Administrative agencies and various stakeholder
groups are also frustrated by the potential for the RRC to paralyze agencies
in their rulemaking efforts on ideological grounds, especially given the
political power of the various lobbying organizations which represent
major constituents of the regulated community.4 On the other side of the
debate, the regulated community is frustrated by the growing number of
rules, the expense of complying with them, and the bureaucratic nightmare
2. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall
be forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6. Several cases brought
in state court have challenged the constitutionality of the RRC. However, courts have not
resolved the issue, either because the relevant cases have been settled or because litigation is still
pending. See generally N.C. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Rules Review Comm'n, 99-CVS-6558, (Wake
County Super. Ct. June 18, 1999) and Harry E. Payne, Comm'r of Labor v. Rules Review
Comm'n, 00-CVS-5367, (Wake County Super. Ct. May 12, 2000) alleging the RRC's
unconstitutionality on separation of powers grounds.
3. Harry E. Payne, Jr., Regulatory Reform: An Administrator's Viewpoint, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 789, 795 (1996).
4. See John N. (Nick) Fountain, Administrative Law Section Tackles Reform of Rulemaking
Process, ADMIN. LAW. (N.C. Bar Ass'n), Dec. 2002, at 3 (pointing out that it can take as long as
eighteen months for a rule to take effect).
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that results from regulatory programs.
An example of a recent controversy illustrates the debate over the role
of the RRC in the rulemaking process. Phase II of the Federal Clean Water
Act,6 which was signed into law in 1999, requires the storm sewer systems
of smaller communities in urbanized areas to be permitted under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program established
under the Act.' In order to comply with this law, states are required to
promulgate stormwater run-off regulations to ensure that minimum federal
standards will be met within the state.8 These rules are known as the Phase
II Stormwater rules. In recent years, North Carolina has undertaken this
rulemaking task, which has involved numerous public workshops,
stakeholder group meetings, and interviews with potentially affected
communities.'
The North Carolina Environmental Management
Commission ("EMC"), the agency charged with developing these rules,
adopted a final version of the rules and submitted them to be reviewed by
the RRC. " The RRC rejected these rules in January of 2004."
Stakeholders that assisted in the drafting process, namely environmental
conservation organizations, and the EMC contends that the RRC objected
to the proposed rules on ideological grounds because of the political
consequences of the rules, especially given the political power of the
lobbying groups opposed to the rules. 2 The most prominent group
3
opposed to the rules is the North Carolina Home Builders Association.1

5. Id.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2002).
7. United States Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge
Phases of the NPDES Program (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) at
Elimination System:
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/swphases.ctm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
8. Id.
9. North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, NPDES Phase H
Stormwater Program (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) at http://h20.enr.state.nc.us/su
JNPDESPhaseIIStormwaterProgram.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).

10. Id.
11. North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, Stormwater Phase
11 Rule Update (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) at http://h20.enr.state.nc.us/ su/Phase_2_Update.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Southern Environmental Law Center, Conservationists Sue
2004),
available at
Water
Quality
(Mar.
8,
State
Officials
to
Protect
http://southemenvironment.org /newsroom/2004/03-08-ncstormwater.shtml (on file with North
Carolina Law Review); Press Release, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Environmental
Group Sues Over N.C. Runoff Rules Rejection (Mar. 8, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); and Press Release, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), N.C. Agency Sues
Another State Board Over Stormwater Rules (Mar. 11, 2004) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review) each alleging that the RRC abused its discretion by rejecting the proposed rules.
13. David McNaught, Careful with the Water, N.C., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 11, 2004, at A23.
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As a result of the RRC's rejection of the rules, a group of environmental
conservation organizations have filed suit in Wake County to challenge the
RRC's decision. 4 The EMC, in addition, has filed a separate suit in Wake
County challenging the RRC's decision. 5 The suits allege that the RRC
abused its discretion in rejecting the rules. While there has been, and likely
will continue to be, a long-running debate between proponents of adding
further-steps in the rulemaking process to make it increasingly difficult for
rules to be promulgated and proponents of expediting the process and
leaving discretion to the agencies, there lurks an underlying controversy.
This controversy concerns the dubious constitutionality of the RRC. Both
the environmental organizations' lawsuit and the EMC's lawsuit allege that
the RRC is itself unconstitutional and is performing duties assigned to the
judicial and legislative branches, in violation of the state constitution. 6
With these concerns in mind, this Comment utilizes a two-pronged
analysis to explore first, the constitutionality of the RRC in terms of the
underlying separation of powers issue, and second, the public policy
concerns raised by the authority vested in the RRC. This Comment takes
the position that the authority granted to the RRC is an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers doctrine and represents unsound
public policy. Part I sets forth the history of the RRC and its authority in
the rulemaking process. Part II first explores whether the RRC is likely to
be construed by the North Carolina courts as an administrative or a
legislative body and takes the position that the RRC is, in fact, a legislative
body. Part II then analyzes the separation of powers doctrine as it has been
applied in North Carolina, in other states, and at the federal level under
circumstances similar to those presented by the RRC. Part HI analyzes the
major public policy concerns raised by the RRC. Finally, Part IV
recommends that the RRC should be removed completely from the
rulemaking process as a matter of respect for constitutional norms and for
sound public policy.
I. RULEMAKING AND RULES REVIEW COMMISSION

A.

North Carolina'sRulemaking Process

In general, the rulemaking process in North Carolina is governed by
the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act ("NCAPA"). 7 Under the
14. N.C. Coastal Fed'n, et al. v. Rules Review Comm'n, 04-CVS-3153 (Wake County
Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2004).
15. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n v. Rules Review Comm'n, 04-CVS-3157 (Wake County Super.
Ct. Mar. 8, 2004).
16. Id.; N.C. Coastal Fed'n, 04-CVS-3153.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1 (2003).
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current rulemaking system, there are three types of rules that an agency
may adopt: emergency rules, temporary rules, and permanent rules. Under
emergency conditions, such as those created by a hurricane or other similar
disaster, agencies have the authority to adopt emergency rules. 8 The
adoption of emergency rules is appropriate when adherence to normal
rulemaking requirements would be detrimental to the public well-being and
the immediate adoption of rules is necessary to avoid a serious and
unforeseen threat to public health and safety. 9 Within forty-eight hours of
submission of the proposed emergency rule to the Office of Administrative
Hearings, the Codifier of Rules must review the agency's statement of need
detailing justifications for the emergency rule.2" If the Codifier of Rules
determines that the rule meets the criteria listed in Section 150B-21.1A of
the North Carolina General Statutes, then the rule is entered into the North
Carolina Administrative Code on the sixth business day following the
approval. 1 If the rule does not meet the criteria, it is returned to the
agency, which may supplement its statement of need and resubmit the rule
for approval.2 2 Under current law, an agency seeking to adopt an
emergency rule must begin the rulemaking procedures on a temporary rule
at the same time the emergency rule is filed with Codifier of Rules. 23 The
emergency rule expires on the earliest of the following dates: (1) the date
specified in the rule; (2) the effective date of the temporary rule adopted to
replace the emergency rule, if the RRC approves the proposed temporary
rule; (3) the date the RRC returns to an agency a temporary rule adopted to
replace the emergency rule; or (4) sixty days from the date the emergency
rule was published in the North Carolina Register, unless the temporary
rule adopted to replace the emergency rule is still before RRC for review.24
Similarly, agencies may adopt a second type of rule, the temporary
rule, when it is determined that adherence to the normal rulemaking
procedures for permanent rules would be contrary to public interest.25 At
least thirty business days prior to adopting a temporary rule, the agency
must submit the proposed temporary rule and a notice of public hearing to
the Codifier of Rules for publication on the Office of Administrative

18. Id. § 150B-21.1A(a).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 150B-21.1A(b). The Codifier of Rules is the Chief Administrative Law Judge of
the Office of Administrative Hearings, or a designated representative thereof, responsible for
entering all rules approved by the RRC into the North Carolina Administrative Code. Id. § 150B2(lc).
21. Id.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT § 150B-21.1A(b) (2003).
23. Id. § 150B-21.1A(a).
24. Id. § 150B-21.1A(d).
25. Id. § 150B-21.1.
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Hearings website.26 In addition, the agency must notify interested parties
of its intent to adopt a temporary rule and of the hearing, accept comments
on the proposed temporary rule for at least fifteen business days prior to
adoption of the rule, and hold at least one hearing on the proposed rule.
Under current law, when an agency adopts a temporary rule, the agency
must submit the rule to the RRC for review.28 It is not until the rule is
approved by the RRC that it may be codified in the North Carolina
Administrative Code.29 A temporary rule expires on the earliest of the
following dates: (1) the date specified in the rule; (2) the effective date of
the permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule, if the RRC
approves the permanent rule; (3) the date the RRC returns to an agency a
permanent rule the agency adopted to replace the temporary rule; (4) the
effective date of an act of the General Assembly that specifically
disapproves a permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule; or (5)
two hundred and seventy days from the date the temporary rule was
published in the North Carolina Register, unless the permanent rule that has
been adopted to replace the temporary rule is before the RRC for review.3 °
The third type of rule that agencies may adopt is the permanent rule.
Although the most recent amendments to the North Carolina
Administrative Procedure Act subject temporary rules to review by the
RRC, this Comment focuses specifically on the review of permanent rules.
Rulemaking begins for permanent rules when a state administrative agency
proposes an administrative rule per legislative mandate from the General
Assembly. The agency proposing the rule must first publish notice of the
proposed rule in the North Carolina Register in addition to a short
explanation for the proposed rule, a citation to the law that gives the agency
the authority to promulgate the rule, the proposed effective date of the rule,
the date, time, and place of any public hearing schedule on the rule or
instructions on how a person may demand a public hearing on a proposed
rule if one is not scheduled, and the process for submitting written
comments on the proposed rule. 3 ' At least fifteen days must elapse
following publication of the notice in the North Carolina Register before
the agency may conduct any public hearing on the proposed rule, and at
least sixty days must elapse before the agency may take any action on the
proposed rule.32 An agency may not adopt a rule that differs substantially

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 150B-21.1(a3)(1).
Id. §§ 150B-2 1.1 (a3)(2) to (4).
Id. § 150B-21.1(b).
Id.
Id. § 150B-21.1(d).
Id. § 150B-21.2(c).
Id. § 150B-21.2 (e).
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from the proposed form published in the notice until the version that has
been adopted has been published in the North Carolina Register for an
additional sixty days.33
Within thirty days of the adoption of the rule, the adopting agency
must file the rule with the North Carolina RRC.34 Only after approval by
the RRC does the adopted rule become effective on the first day of the
month following the month the rule is approved by the RRC, unless the
RRC receives ten or more written objections to the rule from any
concerned parties.35 This provision was added during the most recent series
of amendments to the NCAPA and took effect in August 2003. The
purpose of this provision is to separate the controversial rules from the
non-controversial rules and to expedite the time required for noncontroversial rules to take effect.36 Rules are classified as controversial if
the RRC receives ten or more written objections to the rule from members
of the public. If the RRC receives sufficient objections from persons
clearly requesting legislative review, the rule, which is deemed to be a
controversial rule, is then sent to the floor of the General Assembly.37 The
rule is published in the North Carolina Administrative Code and becomes
effective no earlier than the thirty-first legislative day of the next regular
session of the General Assembly that begins at least twenty-five days after
RRC approves the rule, unless a legislative bill is introduced to disapprove
that specific rule.38 If such a bill is introduced, the rule becomes effective
on the earlier of either the day that an unfavorable final action is taken on
that bill or the day that the session adjourns without ratifying that bill. 39 A
permanent rule disapproved by a bill that is subsequently ratified by the
General Assembly does not become effective and is not entered into the
North Carolina Administrative Code.4"
B.

History of the Rules Review Commission
North Carolina first considered the establishment of a body authorized

33. Id. § 150B-21.2(g).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 150B-21.3(b2).
36. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining the purpose of the legislation proposed by
the Administrative Law Section of the N.C. Bar); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.3(b2)
(2003) (same).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.3(b2) (2003).
38. Id. § 150B-21.3(b).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.3(bl) (2003).
40. North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, Rules Division, Adoption of
PermanentRules, at http://www.oah.state.nc.us/rules (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
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In 1977, the
to suspend or to veto agency rules during the late 1970s.
General Assembly created the Administrative Rules Review Committee,
which was made up of nine legislators. 42 The role of the committee was
one of simple legislative oversight: if the committee identified a problem
with agency regulations, then it recommended corrective legislation in
order to address the problem.43 Increasing frustration with the rulemaking
process led the state to consider establishing a legislative body with the
authority to participate more directly in the process by empowering that
body to suspend or to veto agency rules." Jim Hunt, the governor at the
time, was concerned about the constitutionality of a legislative veto and
brokered a compromise in which a commission, a precursor to the current
RRC, was created.45 The commission was granted the right to object on the
record, but not to veto, proposed rules .46 During widespread revision of the
NCAPA that took place in 1983, Hunt again intervened in the legislative
process and negotiated a compromise for legislative oversight of the
rulemaking process.47 As a result of this compromise, Hunt proposed the
appointment of a Governor's Administrative Rules Review Commission to
oversee the rulemaking process; however, doubts about the
constitutionality of such a commission prevented Hunt from appointing the
commission." The current RRC was finally authorized in 1985, after much
debate, by Section 143B-30.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 49 Its
creation was contingent upon an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court
of North Carolina; curiously, the court never issued such an opinion. 51 In
1986, General Assembly removed the contingency provision and
established the current RRC.51
The RRC's ten members are appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. 2 The
members of the RRC are non-legislators,53 and the term of members

41.

M. Jackson Nichols, Rules Review in North Carolina: History and ConstitutionalIssues,

ADMIN. LAW. (N.C. Bar Ass'n), Nov. 1997, at 1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-30.1(a) (2003).
53. The significance, or more importantly the insignificance, of the fact that the members of
the RRC are non-legislators as opposed to legislators will be discussed at length later in this
Comment. See discussion infra Part I.B. 1.
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appointed to the RRC is limited to two years.54 Additionally, a member of
the RRC may leave during his two year term as a result of his or her
resignation, dismissal, ineligibility, death, or disability.5 Interestingly, the
statute is not explicit about grounds for dismissal, nor is it explicit about
who has the power to dismiss members.
As initially empowered by the General Assembly, the RRC's
objections to rules were merely advisory. The RRC could note an
exception or objection to the proposed rule on the public register, which
induced the agency to make certain that the rule was consistent with
statutory authority.56 Significant amendment to the NCAPA took place in
1995 under the banner of regulatory reform.57 These amendments, which
took effect in 1996, empowered the RRC to veto agency rules.
Consequently, under current law, an objection from the RRC completely
prevents the rule from being implemented, unless the agency makes the
changes to address these objections. 8
Prior to recent amendments to the NCAPA, the procedure for the
judicial review of an RRC decision was at best unclear; the NCAPA was
silent as to the review procedure. However, as of August 2003, when the
RRC objects to a permanent rule adopted by an agency, the agency may
file an action for declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court.5 9
When evaluating rules proposed by agencies, the RRC is required to
review each rule to determine whether the rule satisfies the following
three-pronged test: (1) whether the rule within the statutory authority
delegated to the agency by the General Assembly; (2) whether the rule
clear and unambiguous; and (3) whether the rule reasonably necessary to
fulfill a duty delegated to the agency by the General Assembly.' The rule
must satisfy each of these three criteria, in the opinion of the RRC, in order
for the rule to be approved and, subsequently, to become effective and have
the force of law.
Even when an amendment to a rule is before the RRC for review, the
entire rule (as opposed to exclusively the amendment to the rule) is on
review and can be objected to on any of the above grounds.6 This
provision may have the effect of discouraging agencies from making
minor, practical adjustments that may improve the effectiveness of the rule
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-30.1(b).
55. Id. § 143B-30.1(c).
56. See Nichols, supra note 41 at 3.
57. See generally Payne, supra note 3 (describing the reasons behind political pressure for
regulatory reform in North Carolina during the mid-1990s).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.19(4).
59. Id. § 150B-21.8(d).
60. Id. § 150B-21.9.
61. Id. § 150B-21.8(c).
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for fear that the entire rule will be rejected. However, it may be that the
recent amendment to the NCAPA that provides a mechanism for separating
controversial from non-controversial rules tempers this hesitance.
There is a provision for limited public participation in this process; the
RRC is permitted to call a public hearing for review of a permanent rule.62
In addition, the public has a chance to comment on rules that are before the
63
RRC for review. The public may submit written comments to the RRC
and may also request to make an oral statement before the RRC. 6
The timetable for which the RRC must review proposed rules is
specific. The RRC must review a permanent rule submitted to it on or
before the twentieth of a month by the last day of the next month.65 The
statutory language indicates that the RRC must take action on each rule
submitted by state agencies and may not elect to take no action.
The first time a rule is before the RRC for review, the RRC must take
one of three actions: (1) approve the rule, if the RRC determines that the
rule meets the criteria stated above; (2) object to the rule, if the RRC
determines that the rule does not meet the criteria; or (3) extend the period
for reviewing the rule, if the RRC determines that additional information is
necessary to decide whether the rule satisfies the criteria.6 6 If the RRC
extends the period for reviewing the rule, it is empowered to call a public
hearing on the rule; after a public hearing on a rule, the RRC must approve
the rule or object to the rule within seventy days.67 When the RRC objects
to a rule, the agency has the choice of revising the rule to address the
concerns of the RRC, not revising the rule thereby allowing the rule to die,
68
or filing for a declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court.
When the RRC approves a rule, it sends a report on the rule to the Joint
Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee, which serves
the oversight function of examining rules to which the RRC has objected
and determining if any statutory changes are necessary to carry out the
intent of the General Assembly.69
Theoretically, the RRC's work is limited to an analysis of whether
rules are written or amended in a clear and legally sound manner.
However, opponents of the RRC argue that the RRC "provides a forum to
re-argue policy issues with which agencies have already wrestled"7 and
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. § 150B-21.14.
Id. § 150B-21.2(f).
Id. § 150B-21.2(e).
Id. § 150B-21.9(b).
Id.§ 150B-21.10.
Id.§ 150B-21.14.
Id.§ 150B-21.12.
Id.§ 150B-21.11.
John Wagner, Ten Citizens With Clout Irk Rule Makers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
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that the criteria used by the RRC in reviewing rules are too vague,
increasing the risk that the RRC will be able to paralyze agency action
based on ideology and political pressure.7 Because of frustration with the
RRC process, many agencies in the past have chosen to adopt temporary
rules, which at one point were not subject to review by the Commission,72
as opposed to permanent rules. However, legislation proposed and
approved during the 2003 legislative session subjects even temporary rules
to review by the RRC, cutting off the chance for agencies to evade RRC
scrutiny.7 3
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND BEYOND:
LEGAL ANALYSIS

The North CarolinaTradition

A.

The tradition of strict interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine in North Carolina supports the argument that the authority granted
to the RRC is unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge. The North
Carolina Constitution expressly mandates that the three branches of the
state government be "forever separate and distinct."74 Further, each of the
three constitutions ratified by the people of North Carolina since its
inception as a state in 1776 have explicitly embraced the doctrine of
separation of powers by providing that the three branches of the
government be "forever separate and distinct" from one another.75 The first
two constitutions provided that the three branches of the government
"ought to be forever separate and distinct" from each other. 76 The third
constitution contains similar language with the substitution of "shall be" for

N.C.), Feb. 20, 2000, at Al.
71.

See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism:

State Administrative Procedure and

Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 551, 563 (2001) (suggesting that the RRC has used its
authority to veto several controversial rules, likely in response to political pressure from those
opposed to the rules).
72. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 1; see also Wagner, supra note 70 at Al (noting that in the
wake of Hurricane Floyd, environmental officials pushed through several temporary rules dealing
with conditions created by the flooding, such as flooded junk yards, as opposed to formulating
permanent rules to address the situation, simply because of the exigency necessitated by the
situation and the potential for delay by the RRC).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.8(b).
74. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall
be forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6. "The legislative power
of the State will be vested in the General Assembly." Id. art. II, § 7. "The executive power of the
§ 1. "The judicial power of the State will be
State will be vested in the Governor." Id. art. III,
vested in the judiciary." Id. art. IV, § 1.
75. See Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 595, 286 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1982).
76. Id.
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"ought to be," this substitution further solidifying and making explicit the
commitment of the state to the doctrine of the separation of powers.77
There are other indications that North Carolina has strictly adhered to
the principle of the separation of powers, most notably the relative dearth
of cases that have come before the courts contending that one branch of the
government interfered with the powers of another.78 The outcome of these
few cases that have come before the courts indicate the courts' traditionally
formalistic approach to, and respect for, the separation of powers. The
earliest example of an expression of opinion on the separation of powers
principle occurred in Bayard v. Singleton,7 9 in which Justice Ashe of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina observed that the separation of powers is
the "very foundation of our system of government."80 In the later case of
State v. Bell,81 Justice Stacy of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that:
[t]he people of North Carolina have ordained in their Constitution
(Art. I, sec. 8) that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the Government should be and ought to remain forever
separate and distinct from each other. Such is their expressed will,
and from the earliest period in our history they have endeavored with
sedulous care to guard this great principle of the separation of the
powers.82
The more recent case of Wallace v. Bone 3 illustrates with more
specificity the North Carolina courts' respect for the separation of powers.
In Wallace, the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered a statute
governing the appointment of members to the state's EMC.84 The central
issue in the case was whether the statute, by which two members of the
House of Representatives and two members of the Senate were appointed
to membership on the EMC, violated the separation of powers principle
expressly mandated by the North Carolina Constitution.8 5 The court
concluded that this provision did in fact violate the separation of powers
principle and was thus unconstitutional. 6 The court, after commenting on
77. See id.
78. See id. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84. Since the Wallace decision, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has addressed the issue of separation of power only in advisory opinion. See In re
Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
79. 1 N.C. 5 (1787).
80. See id. at 6.
81. 184N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190(1922).
82. Id. at 719, 115 S.E. at 199.
83. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
84. Id. at 606-07, 286 S.E.2d at 87.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81.
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North Carolina's tradition of strict adherence to the separation of powers,
pointed to the statutory language that authorized the EMC and noted that it
is the duty of the EMC to promulgate rules and regulations designed to
protect the natural resources of the state.87 Based on the language of the
statute, the court found it apparent that the duties of the EMC are executive
in nature and thus that the EMC is an administrative agency.88 According
to the court, it is unconstitutional for the General Assembly to "create a
special instrumentality of the government to implement specific legislation
and then to attempt to retain some control over the process of
implementation."89
Because the actions of the General Assembly
represented an attempt to interfere with the duties of the executive branch
of the government, the court held that the legislation in question violated
the separation of powers principle.90 The court was careful to note that
North Carolina, for many years, has benefited from cooperation between
the various branches of the government. 9' However, the court noted that
respect for this principle by each branch of the government is paramount,
because the people of North Carolina have been steadfast in their
commitment to maintaining separate and distinct branches of government
and have explicitly embraced this principle as the cornerstone of their
government. 92
When asked to comment on a similar constitutional issue in light of its
decision in Wallace, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Advisory
Opinion in re Separation of Powers,93 evaluated a statute that authorized a
joint legislative committee to make budgetary decisions of the type
typically reserved for the executive authorities.94 Because the statute
empowered the legislative committee to "administer the budget," the court
observed that it exceeded the legislature's constitutionally mandated power
and encroached on the responsibility of the Governor to "administer the
budget."95 This legislative encroachment upon the executive's power was
sufficient to violate the principle of the separation of powers and thus
rendered the legislation unconstitutional.96
87. Id. at 607, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
88. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 89.
91. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
92. Id.
93. 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
94. Id. at 768-71, 295 S.E.2d at 590-91.
95. Id. at 780, 295 S.E.2d at 596 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. M, § 5).
96. At the same time, evidence exists that adherence to the doctrine of the separation of
powers in North Carolina has not been as strict as suggested by the decision in Wallace and the
advisory opinion that followed. For example, Professor John Orth argued that public policy,
rather than legal arguments, may better explain judicial declarations on the separation of powers
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Separationof Powers: Legal Analysis

Research on constitutional challenges based on the separation of
powers doctrine beyond North Carolina case law, under circumstances
similar to those presented by the RRC, reveals two distinct themes in the
grounds for a legal challenge to the RRC's constitutionality: legislative
encroachment upon the executive power and legislative encroachment upon
judicial power. Consequently, this analysis focuses on these two themes.
The analysis and the application of these two themes are dependent upon
whether the RRC is a legislative body or an executive body. Therefore,
this analysis first discusses that question.
1. Is the RRC a Legislative or an Executive Body?
The General Assembly has asserted that the RRC is an administrative
agency under Article III, Section 11 of the North Carolina Constitution.9 7
The courts accord deference to such legislative decisions; however, North
Carolina precedent establishes that it is the responsibility of the appellate

in North Carolina, but questioned whether public policy is well served by the results. See John V.
Orth, Forever Separate and Distinct: Separation of Powers in North Carolina,62 N.C. L. REV.
1, 2 (1983). Orth argued that the court's decision in Wallace, based on the history of the
separation of powers in North Carolina, is "unpersuasive." Id. at 2. Orth noted that North
Carolina case law supports a liberal, as opposed to a strict, interpretation of the separation of
powers clause, in order to meet the needs of the modem legislature in dealing with the increasing
complexity of problems that it must address. To support his contention that the principle of the
separation of powers has not been as strictly adhered to as asserted in Wallace, Orth referred to
Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d
402 (1978), where the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a delegation of legislative power
to an administrative agency because the court found that it was necessary for the General
Assembly to delegate such power in light of the complexities which confronted the General
Assembly and that the General Assembly had provided adequate guidance in its delegation of
power. Id. at 9-10.
Further, Orth argued that the court's opinion in Advisory Opinion in re Separation of
Powers was incorrectly based in the doctrine of the separation of powers. Orth pointed out that
only if the General Assembly had delegated its plenary power to a coordinate branch of the
government would there be a violation of the separation of powers, but because the General
Assembly had delegated authority to a group of its members, the issue was not one of separation
of powers. Id. at 23. Orth also mentioned that public policy considerations, which he termed
"constitutional morality," may have motivated the decision in Wallace, as opposed to a strict
adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Id. at 26-27. Such "constitutional
morality" includes concern about the implications for the executive branch, in that a contrary
result in Wallace would "imperil the integrity of the office of the governor," and concern about
the integrity of the judicial branch, in that the increase in legislative power may weaken the
power of the judiciary via the legislature's control over the funds for judicial personnel. Id. at
26-27. However, despite Orth's duly noted points, the majority of North Carolina precedent
relating to the separation of powers and the history of the state constitution seems to lend support
to the credibility of the argument that North Carolina does have a tradition of strict adherence to
the doctrine.
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-30.1(c) (2003).
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courts to examine an agency in order to determine the branch of
government to which it must be assigned for purposes of constitutional
98
review.
This Comment takes the position that the RRC is not an administrative
body but is instead a legislative body. Because there is no North Carolina
case law that addresses this point, it is necessary to look outside of the state
for support of this argument. A United States Supreme Court case involved
a line of reasoning which supports the argument that the RRC is a
legislative body, assuming that the analysis of the North Carolina
Constitution would follow federal guidelines. Unlike the North Carolina
Constitution, there is not an explicit separation of powers clause in the
United States Constitution, thus lending further credence to the argument
that the RRC violates the principles expressed in the state's constitution.
In Bowsher v. Synar,99 the United States Supreme Court was faced
with the task of determining to which branch of the government the
Comptroller General should be assigned. After referring to provisions in
the Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, which indicate that Congress
has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an officer of the
legislative branch, and after pointing out that comptrollers general
traditionally have viewed themselves as part of the legislative branch,"° the
Court noted the fact that the Comptroller General is removable from office
only at the will of Congress. l1 Because Congress retained this removal
authority over the Comptroller General, the Comptroller General was
subservient to Congress, and the Court concluded that the Comptroller
General was, for this reason, a legislative body. 2 The Court held that by
placing the responsibility for executing the laws in a body that was
removable only by the will of Congress, Congress had impermissibly
intruded into the province of the executive branch of the government.'0 3
By analogy to the Bowsher court's reasoning, the RRC is a legislative
body because, like the Comptroller General, the RRC is "controlled" by the
legislative branch of the government if the General Assembly retains the
power to dismiss members of the RRC from office."° The power of
removal is dispositive under Bowsher; according to the Bowsher court,
because Congress had the sole power to remove the Comptroller General
98. See generally 60 N.C. Op. Att'y. Gen. 70, 74 (1991) (pointing out that the rule in North
Carolina is the appellate courts determine to which branch of government a body belongs).
99. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
100. Seeid. at731.
101. See id. at 727.
102. See id. at 732.
103. See id. at 734.
104. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-30.1(c) (2003) (referring to the General Assembly's power
to appoint a new member in the case of dismissal).
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from office, the Comptroller General could not be entrusted with
administrative powers. Therefore, if the General Assembly retains control
over the RRC to the same extent that Congress retains control over the
Comptroller General, then the authority vested in the RRC falls within the
Bowsher court's analysis.10 5
In addition to this federal decision, there is support at the state level
for the argument that the RRC is a legislative body. For example, the state
of Pennsylvania established a commission similar to that of the RRC to
When the
oversee the administrative rulemaking process. °6
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania commission was challenged, the
commonwealth court held that the commission violated the separation of
powers because the commission was a legislative body empowered to
interfere with the administrative rulemaking process.0 7 The court reached
its decision by reasoning that the function of the commission rendered it a
The commission was composed of legislators
legislative body.'0 8
appointed by the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate and by the Governor; the functions of the commission included
overseeing the adoption of rules, reporting violations of statutory authority
or legislative intent to the legislature, and delaying the enactment of rules
to which it objected. 9 The RRC, under the Pennsylvania court's
reasoning, is also a legislative body.
Similarly to the RRC, the Pennsylvania commission was composed of
non-legislators appointed by the General Assembly. The commonwealth
court noted that the removal power which rested with the General
Assembly was sufficient to characterize the commission as legislative." 0
Additionally, as with the RRC in North Carolina, the Pennsylvania
commission's powers involved oversight and review, which the
commonwealth court designated as legislative functions."' The RRC bears
significant resemblance to the Pennsylvania commission, which the
commonwealth court declared to be an "agent of the legislature" because
the commission was "empowered to perform preliminary oversight
functions.""' 2
However, according to the General Assembly, the RRC is an
administrative agency, established pursuant to legislative mandate, to
105. See the discussion of whether the General Assembly has the power to dismiss members
of the RRC infra Part I.B.
106. Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 745-46 (Pa. 1989).
107. See id. at 749-50.
108. See id. at 748.
109. Id.

110. Id. at 748.
111. Id. at 749.
112. Id.
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oversee the administrative rulemaking process. This is a flawed argument,
because in North Carolina the Governor (not the General Assembly) has
constitutionally granted power to appoint all officers of the executive
branch whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, and to
reorganize the allocation of offices and agencies as he considers necessary
for efficient administration.'
This constitutional provision raises an
interesting question pertaining to the RRC if it can be interpreted to
establish a constitutional appointment power in the Governor." 4 If the
RRC were an administrative body as declared by the General Assembly, it
would be the constitutional responsibility of the Governor and the
executive branch of the government to appoint its members. The United
States Supreme Court has said that "legislative power, as distinguished
from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce
them or appoint agents charged with the duty of such enforcement."' 5 The
General Assembly's appointment of the RRC members lends further
credence to the argument that the body is a legislative and not an
administrative body. Further, as a result of this constitutional grant of
power, changes may be made to the functions, powers, and duties of
agencies as the Governor deems appropriate." 6 There is no mention,
however, in the RRC's statutory authority of any power of the Governor
over the functions and decisions of the RRC. If the Governor does not
have the power to reorganize the RRC or change its functions, powers, and
duties, then concluding that the RRC is an administrative agency under the
North Carolina Constitution is dubious.
At this point, the composition of the RRC merits discussion in order to
facilitate subsequent analysis. The composition of North Carolina's RRC
is unlike a majority of the other oversight bodies analyzed in this Comment
because the RRC is composed entirely of non-legislators, as opposed to
legislators.
However, the composition of the RRC is not indicative of whether the
authority granted to the RRC represents a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine and is nothing more than the General Assembly's cautious
reaction to the Wallace decision. In Wallace, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reached the conclusion "that the legislature cannot constitutionally
create a special instrumentality of government to implement specific
legislation and then retain some control over the process of implementation

113. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5.
114. This provision has also been interpreted to mean that this appointment power arises only
in the absence of legislation. See Nichols, supra note 41, at 4.
115. See Springer v. Philippines Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928).
116. SeeN.C. CONST. art. I1l, § 5.
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by appointing legislators" to serve on that body."1 7 At issue in Wallace was
a statute that purported to give the General Assembly the power to appoint
its own members to serve on the Environmental Management Commission
("EMC").11 8 The court found it "crystal clear" that the duties of the EMC
are administrative in character and "have no relation to the function of the
legislative branch of government." 1 9 The court, despite its conclusion,
recognized that there should be cooperation between the branches of
government and that many study commissions exist on which legislators
and persons from other branches of government have served that have
made useful recommendations that subsequently have been enacted into
law. 20 However, the court was clear in declaring that the General
Assembly may not attempt to exert its control over the implementation of
the laws by appointing its own members to serve on agencies designed to
do just that.
Appointing non-legislators to serve on the RRC was likely a reaction
to the court's decision in Wallace. If the General Assembly had appointed
legislators to serve on the RRC, the RRC would have, both in form and
function, been an egregious move by the General Assembly to maintain a
degree of control over the implementation of the laws. By appointing nonlegislators, the General Assembly acted, by all appearances, in conformity
with the court's declaration in Wallace that members of the General
Assembly cannot be appointed to serve on administrative bodies.
Appointing non-legislators lends credibility to the argument that the RRC
is an administrative body. Because the General Assembly has a vested
interest in the RRC's classification as an administrative body, it is not
surprising that the General Assembly took such action to lend credence to
its assertion that the RRC is an administrative body, and to mitigate firstglance separation of powers concerns. Regardless, while in form the RRC
may appear to be an administrative body, in function it is a legislative body
and a flagrant attempt by the General Assembly to retain a degree of
control over the implementation of the laws.
2. Encroachment upon the Powers of the Executive
The theme of encroachment by the legislative branch upon the duty of
the executive branch to implement laws is prevalent in the separation of
powers challenges that have occurred in other states under circumstances
analogous to those of the RRC. This theme may be subdivided into two

117.
118.
119.
120.

Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 608, 286 S.E.2d 79, 88 (1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sub-themes: interference as a result of unilateral control of administrative
rulemaking, and interference as a result of circumventing the usual formal
requirements of enactment and presentment. Utilizing both sub-themes as
analytical frameworks, this Section of the Comment proposes that the
authority granted to the RRC represents an unconstitutional interference by
the General Assembly in the constitutional duties of the executive branch.
A successful challenge to the RRC's constitutionality under either of these
sub-themes rests on the assumption that the RRC is classified as a
legislative body.
a.

"Special Instrumentality of the Government"

The idea behind the first sub-theme was articulated by the Wallace
court:
the legislature cannot "create a special instrumentality of
government to implement specific legislation and then retain unilateral
control over the process of this implementation. 121 The precedent of
several other states illustrates that the legislature may not retain unilateral
control over the rulemaking process, specifically, the case law of states
whose constitutions provide expressly for the separation of powers, like
that of North Carolina."' This Section argues that if North Carolina courts
were to follow the analysis of the other states that have addressed
analogous bodies, the authority granted to the RRC would represent an
attempt by the General Assembly to retain unilateral control over the
rulemaking process and would thereby violate the principle of the
separation of powers.
In State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 23 the Supreme Court of West
Virginia ruled that the statutory provisions empowering the legislative
rulemaking review committee to veto rules and regulations violated the
separation of powers doctrine expressly provided for in West Virginia's
constitution.' 24 The legislative rulemaking review committee was a body
comprised of six members of the Senate and six members of the House,
and was authorized by the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act to
veto rules proposed by the state agencies. 125 In support of its decision, the
court stated that the legislature had attempted to invest itself with the power
to promulgate rules having the force and effect of laws without following
the constitutional limitations imposed upon the legislative branch in the

121. Id.
122. The constitutions of the states relied upon in this section of the analysis-West Virginia,
Missouri, Kentucky, and New Jersey-provide explicitly for the separation of powers.
123. 279 S.E.2d 622 (W.Va. 1981).
124. W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
125. See Barker, 279 S.E. 2d 622, at 633 (1981).
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exercise of that power."' The legislature abdicated its power to make rules
in favor of the executive and then asserted that because rulemaking power
is legislative in nature, it may step into the role of the executive and veto
administrative rules free from the constitutional restraints on its power to
legislate.'27 The court referred to this attempt by the legislature as an "extra
legislative control device" because it allowed the legislature to act as
something other than a legislative body to control the actions of the other
branches of the government. 28
The state of Missouri offers a second example. In Missouri Coalition
for the Environment v. Joint Committee on Administrative Rules,129 the
Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the statutory provisions that suspended
the promulgation of agency rules pending review by the Joint Committee
on Administrative Rules ("JCAR"), and that permit the JCAR to suspend
and withdraw rules already promulgated by agencies, violated the
separation of powers doctrine, which is explicit in the Missouri
Constitution.13 ° The JCAR was authorized to delay administrative rules
indefinitely, which created, in effect, a power to veto rules. 3' In ruling that
this power was unconstitutional, the court, after a preliminary
determination that the JCAR was a legislative as opposed to administrative
body, noted that the challenged statutory provision permitted the legislature
to interfere with the functions of the executive branch and to circumvent
the constitution's bill passage and presentment requirements.1 32 The court
continued that the "legislature may not unilaterally control execution of
rulemaking authority after its delegation of rulemaking power, regardless
of whether it does so by suspension, revocation, or prior approval of
administrative rules. 1 3
The state of Kentucky offers a third example. In Legislative Research
Commission v. Brown,13 1 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that statutory
provisions authorizing a subcommittee of the Legislative Research
Commission, the Administration Regulation Review Subcommittee
("ARRS"), to veto proposed administrative regulations violated the explicit
separation of powers doctrine incorporated into the Kentucky
Constitution. 35 The ARRS was a committee of seven members of the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 633 (using quotation marks to emphasize the particular phrase).

948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997).
MO. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
See Missouri Coalition,948 S.W.2d at 129.
See id. at 133.
See id. at 134.
664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
Ky. CONST. § 27-28.
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legislature authorized to oversee administrative rulemaking. 36 In deciding
that the veto power granted to the ARRS violated the separation of powers
doctrine, the court focused on the interference of the ARRS, which it
determined to be a legislative body, with the functions of the executive
branch.' 37 The court determined that the authority granted to the ARRS
encroached on the power granted to the executive branch because the
was to implement and carry
constitutionally mandated role of the executive
38
out the purpose of legislative enactments.
The state of New Jersey provides a fourth and final example. In
General Assembly of the State of New Jersey v. Byrne, 139 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held unconstitutional, as a violation of the separation of
powers, the authority of a legislative committee to veto administrative
The court based its determination on the grounds that this
rules."
authority undermined the performance by executive agencies of their duty
to implement statutes through the adoption of regulatory schemes. Further,
executive agencies, faced with potential paralysis from repeated use of the
veto that would disrupt coherent regulatory schemes, might retreat from
fulfilling their constitutionally mandated duties. 4 '
Thus, the case law from states with a strong commitment to the
separation of powers support the notion that the legislative branch of the
government may not retain unilateral control over the process of the
implementation of legislation.' 42 The RRC, a commission created by the
General Assembly to oversee the implementation of legislative enactments
through the rulemaking process, while not comprised of legislators,
represents an attempt by the General Assembly to exert its influence in the

136. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 911.
137. Id. at 920.
138. See id. at 919-20.
139. 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
140. See id. at 444.
141. See id.
142. A minority of states has found that unilateral legislative control of administrative
rulemaking does not violate the separation of powers principle. Unlike the constitutions of most
states holding that legislative control of rulemaking violates the separation of powers, the
constitutions of states upholding the constitutionality of legislative control typically make no
express provision for the separation of powers. For example, the separation of powers provision
is only implicit in the Wisconsin Constitution. In Martinez v. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human
Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 1992), an action was brought challenging the constitutionality
of a statute empowering the Legislature's Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules
("JCRAR") to suspend administrative rules after adoption by administrative agencies. The court
held that since the existence of the administrative agency is dependent on the will of the
legislature and since its powers are circumscribed by the legislature, it is appropriate for the
legislature to delegate rulemaking authority to an agency while retaining a right to review those
rules. Therefore, the court concluded that the constitutional challenge to the legislature's power
to suspend administrative rules was without merit. Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 586.
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rulemaking process, and to retain unilateral control over the
implementation of legislation. As this attempt to retain control necessarily
impedes the agencies from implementing legislation independent of
encroachment from the other branches of the government, the RRC
embodies an unconstitutional interference by the General Assembly with
the duties constitutionally reserved to the executive branch of the
government.
b.

Enactment and Presentment Requirements

A second sub-theme under the larger theme of interference with the
powers of the executive branch is that allowing the legislature to overturn
decisions made by the executive branch without following typical
constitutional bicameralism and presentment requirements is a violation of
the separation of powers principle because it precludes participation by the
executive branch in what is essentially lawmaking action.'4 3 This Section
suggests that if the North Carolina courts were to follow the analysis of
other states and of the United States, the authority granted to the RRC
would represent an unconstitutional exclusion of the executive branch in
lawmaking action, thereby violating the principle of the separation of
powers.
The closest that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has come to
commenting on this issue occurred in In re Separation of Powers, where
the court determined that the statute that purported to give the Joint
Legislative Committee on Governmental Operations the power to control
major line item budget transfers proposed by the executive branch
exceeded the power granted to the legislative branch.'" The court reasoned
that the General Assembly could not delegate to a legislative committee the
power to make decisions pertaining to the acceptance of the proposed
budget because the constitution requires that the General Assembly enact
the budget, indicating that the budget must undergo bicameral passage and
presentment to the Governor.'45 The court concluded that the attempt to

143. Under the federal constitutional scheme, every bill must pass both the House of
Representatives and the Senate before being sent to the President for final approval, in order for
the bill to become a law. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7(2). Similarly, under the North Carolina
constitutional scheme, all bills must be approved by each house of the General Assembly before
being presented to the Governor for final approval of the bill before it becomes a law. N.C.
CONST. art. II, § 22(1). Under the federal scheme and the analogous N.C. state scheme, passage
by both houses of the legislature is known as bicameralism; presentment occurs when the bill is
delivered to the executive branch for final approval. Bicameralism and presentment are typically
required in order for a bill to become a law and are the constitutional foundations of lawmaking
action. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
144. In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 775, 295 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1982).
145. Id. at 776, 295 S.E. 2d at 595.
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vest certain members of the legislative branch with this power exceeded
that given to the legislative branch by the constitution and constituted an
encroachment upon the constitutional duty and responsibility imposed on
the Governor, thereby constituting a violation of the separation of
powers. 146
The case law of several other states analyzes this sub-theme under
circumstances analogous to those presented by the RRC. For example, in
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives,147 the Kansas
Supreme Court analyzed a statutory provision which empowered the
legislature to adopt, modify, or revoke administrative rules and
regulations. 148 The court held that the statutory provision constituted a
"significant interference by the legislative branch with the executive branch
'
and constitute[d] an unconstitutional usurpation of powers."149
The court
based its decision on the fact that the power claimed by the legislature gave
it the ability to direct exclusively and to control the exercise of
administrative discretion. 5 ° The legislature, in modifying or revoking the
rules proposed by administrative agencies, was effectively enacting
legislation because its actions were affecting the legal rights and duties of
persons outside of the legislature.' 5' As such, the court noted that the
legislature must act within the confines of the constitution, complying with
enactment and presentment formalities.5 2
Non-compliance with the
formalities of enactment and presentment forecloses the executive powers
from participation in the lawmaking process, thereby violating the
separation of powers principle.'5 3
Similarly, in Missouri Coalition for the Environment v. Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules, 5 4 the Missouri Supreme Court
analyzed the constitutionality of the Joint Committee on Administrative
Rules ("JCAR"), a committee of legislators appointed to review and to
oversee the administrative rulemaking process. The JCAR was empowered
146. The court considered whether the General Assembly could delegate to a commission of
legislators the power to deny the Governor the authority to make budgetary transfers, a power that
is constitutionally reserved for the General Assembly. Professor Orth argues that the delegation
of power does not necessarily implicate the principle of the separation of powers. When a
legislature delegates its plenary power to a group of its members, a constitutional issue is raised.
However, only if that delegation is made to a coordinate branch of the government is the issue

one involving separation of powers. See Orth, supra note 96, at 22.
147. 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984).
148. See id. at 626.
149. See id. at 635-36.

150. See id. at 637.
151. See id. at 638.
152. See id.

153. See id.
154. 948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997).

N. C. RULES REVIEW COMMISSION

2004]

2115

to review, suspend, and nullify rules. 5 The court held that the statutory
provision authorizing the JCAR to modify, revoke and nullify agency rules
permitted legislative circumvention of the Missouri Constitution's bill
passage
and
presentment
requirements
and was
therefore
unconstitutional.' 56 Like the Kansas court in Stephens, the Missouri court
reasoned that the JCAR's power to revoke rules was in effect legislative
and was subject to the constitutional mandates of bicameralism and
presentment to the Governor.' 57 Non-compliance with these requirements
precluded the Governor's participation and egregiously ignored the process
required by the state.'58
The New Jersey Supreme Court in General Assembly of the State of
New Jersey v. Byrne,5 9 held the Legislative Oversight Act to be
unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislative action it permitted
contravened the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the New
Jersey Constitution. 60 The act allowed the legislature to veto virtually
every rule proposed by state administrative agencies. 6 ' The court noted
that any legislative action, such as that authorized by the Legislative
Oversight Act, that removes the Governor from lawmaking violates the
presentment requirements of the constitution and represents a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine. 162 According to the court, the legislature
can use the power granted to it under the act "to exert a policy-making
effect equivalent to amending or repealing existing legislation. A veto
which effectively amends or repeals existing law offends the constitution
because it is tantamount to the passage of a new law without the approval
of the Governor."''

63

This result, the court concluded, violated the

separation of powers."
Along these same lines, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
Opinion of the Justices,165 in commenting on the constitutionality of a
legislative proposal that would empower a legislative committee to review
and to accept or reject rules proposed by state agencies, noted that the
legislature may not delegate its lawmaking authority to a smaller legislative

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See
See
See
See
448

160.
161.
162.
163.

See id.
at
See id.
at
See id.
at
See id.
at

id. at 129.
id. at 134.
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165. 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981).
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body and evade the constitutional enactment requirements. 66 The court
reasoned that the approval or rejection of proposed agency rules is
undoubtedly an exercise of legislative power and that under the state
constitution all resolutions of the legislature must be presented to the
executive branch for its approval. 67 Because the proposed legislation did
not make provision for participation in the rulemaking oversight by the
executive powers of the government, the court concluded that the power
granted to the legislature under the proposed legislation was
68
unconstitutional.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Blank v. Department of
Corrections,69 when considering the constitutionality of legislation
empowering the legislature's Joint Committee on Administrative Rules
("JCAR") to veto administrative rules, concluded that the power granted to
JCAR was unconstitutional as a violation the separation of powers
doctrine. 7 ° The court based its decision on the absence of a provision for
presentment to the executive powers of the state for the approval of a
veto.171 The court concluded that because there was no provision in the
legislation for presentment to the executive of the legislature's veto of a
rule, such legislative action goes essentially unchecked, and "unchecked
power is precisely what the separation of powers doctrine sought to
avoid."' 7 2
Thus, there is substantial case law from other states that supports the
contention that the authority granted to the RRC is unconstitutional because
this authority allows the RRC to engage in unchecked legislative action.'7 3
The United States Supreme Court ruled on a somewhat similar issue in
I.N.S. v. Chadha,7 4 when the Court struck down a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which allowed either house of Congress

166. See id. at 788.
167. See id. at 788-89.
168. See id.at 788.
169. 564 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. 1997).
170. See id. at 136.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. However, case law from other states arrives at the opposite conclusion under similar
circumstances to those presented by the RRC. For example, in analyzing the constitutionality of
a statute that authorized the legislative repeal of agency rules and regulations, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990), held that since agency rules and regulations
are less than the equivalent of statutory law, they need not be rejected by bicameral passage and

presentment as required for the rejection of statutory law. See id.at 416-17. The court further
reasoned that agency rulemaking power comes from legislative delegation; rulemaking that
comes from a delegation of power is "neither the legal nor functional equivalent of constitutional
power." See id. at 417.

174. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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to veto by resolution a certain act by the Attorney General. This provision
permitted Congress to overturn a decision made by an officer of the
executive branch without following the formal enactment process
mandated by the United States Constitution for such "legislative" action.'75
The passage of such a resolution under this Act was interpreted as
legislative action because it had the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons outside of the legislative branch.' 76
The Court then pointed out that Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution requires that such legislative action be subject to passage by a
majority of both houses and presentment to the President for approval. 7 7
Bicameral and presentment requirements were intended to maintain the
separation of powers, and the limits on the circumscribed powers of each
78
branch must not be eroded.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the legislative
veto authorized by the provision at issue in Chadha was doubtless a
convenient shortcut and appealing compromise between the executive and
legislative branches. 179 Despite the possibilities of delay and potential for
abuse encountered in complying with constitutional mandates, the Court
declared that there is no better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the constraints articulated in the
Constitution. 8 °
Therefore, because the constitutionally mandated
procedures of bicameralism and presentment were not required to enact the
resolution overturning a decision made by an officer of the executive
branch, the provision of the Act allowing, for the resolution was
8
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers.' '
The functions of the RRC appear equivalent to the legislative function
analyzed by the Chadha court. Undeniably, the veto of administrative rules
has the effect of altering the legal rights of persons outside of the
legislature.' 8 2 Allowing the RRC to nullify rules proposed by agencies
permits the RRC, and arguably the General Assembly, to overturn
decisions of the executive branch while circumventing the constitutional
bicameral passage and presentment requirements. Therefore, in order to
comply with constitutional requirements of the North Carolina
Constitution, such action must include bicameral passage and
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presentment. 183
Additionally, the functions of the RRC are substantially similar to the
legislative bodies of the other states which were found to be
unconstitutional. The RRC has the power to delay indefinitely and to
prevent from taking effect any and all rules proposed by the agencies of the
state, and there is no formal enactment procedure that the RRC must follow
in exercising these powers. By the reasoning of Chadha and other cases in
states that have addressed this issue, the authority granted to the RRC
violates the separation of powers principle because enactment and
presentment procedures are not required of the RRC when it vetoes the
rules promulgated by the executive branch of the government.18
3. Encroachment upon the Powers of the Judiciary
A second theme prevalent among constitutional challenges made
under circumstances similar to those presented by the RRC is that
legislative control over the rulemaking process violates the separation of
powers doctrine if the process involves a determination by the legislative
branch of whether the rule complies with enabling statutory authority. This
analysis is not dependent on whether the RRC is classified as an executive
or legislative body. Thus, this argument may provide a respectable
fall-back position, in that if the constitutionality of the RRC cannot be
attacked on the grounds that its authority encroaches on the powers
constitutionally mandated to the executive branch of the government, it can
be attacked on the grounds that the authority granted to the RRC
impermissibly invades the constitutional purview of the judiciary.
The interference with judicial authority by the legislative branch under
circumstances similar to those presented by the RRC has been addressed by
other states.
For example, in Legislative Research Commission v.

183. See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 22(1).
184. North Carolina could take the position of the Idaho court in Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d
410 (Idaho 1990), which held that since agency rules are less than the equivalent of statutory law,
they need not be rejected by some process of "equal dignity" to legislative enactment. See Mead,
791 P.2d at 414-17. The United States Supreme Court, when addressing a similar issue, held that
rules and regulations are not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term, and that
Congress might rightfully entrust to administrative agencies the determination of such minor
matters as are covered by rules and regulations. See U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-17
(1910). However, in North Carolina, where an agency has the authority to act, its rules and
regulations have the binding effect of statutory law and may accordingly alter the common law
because regulations that are authorized by statutory law are the tools used to effectuate the policy
and purposes of the statutory law. Taylor v. Superior Motor Co., 227 N.C. 365, 367, 42 S.E.2d

460, 461 (1947).

Given North Carolina's traditional formalistic approach to constitutional

jurisprudence, it seems unlikely that a court would be willing to find that a general power to veto
agency regulations by informal legislative action is permissible. See supra Part II.A.
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Brown, 85 the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
several acts of the Kentucky General Assembly that confer certain powers
on the Administration Regulation Review Subcommittee of the Legislative
Research Commission (LRC), which exercised oversight and review of
administrative regulations.
The subcommittee was charged with
determining whether a regulation conformed to the statutory authority
under which it was authorized and whether it carried out the legislative
intent of that statutory authority.' 86 The subcommittee's findings were the
basis for the acceptance or the rejection of the regulation.' 87 The court
found that the review of regulations to determine whether they comply with
statutory authority and with legislative intent was "unequivocally" a
responsibility that has been constitutionally reserved to the judicial branch
of the government.' 88 This encroachment on the powers of the judiciary led
the court to conclude that the statutory scheme authorizing rules review by
the LRC violated the separation of powers doctrine.'89
The Idaho Supreme Court, addressing a similar issue in Mead v.
Arnell, 9 ° came to the opposite conclusion. The court determined that the
statutory authority empowering the legislature to review and to interpret
rules and regulations in order to determine if they complied with the
legislative intent of the enabling statute was constitutional. 9' However, the
court distinguished between legislative review to determine whether the
rules comport with legislative intent, and legislative review to determine
whether the rules conform to the enabling statutory authority.'92 Only
because the legislature was empowered to determine whether rules
comported with legislative intent, as opposed to statutory authority, did the
court reach the conclusion that the legislature, in its review of
administrative rules, did not usurp the power constitutionally assigned to
the judiciary, which leaves room to infer that the Idaho court might have
reached the same conclusion as the Kentucky court if the legislature were
determining compliance with statutory authority.
If North Carolina were to look to the precedent of other states by
analogy, the grant of judicial power to the RRC would be unconstitutional.
The RRC, the functional equivalent of Kentucky's Administration
Regulation Review Subcommittee, is charged with determining whether

185. 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
186. Id. at917-18.
187. Id.

188. Id. at 919.
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791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990).
Id. at 420-21.
Id.

2120

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

proposed rules conform to the statutory authority under which they are
authorized. Because this function is constitutionally reserved to the
judiciary, encroachment by the RRC on judicial responsibility represents a
violation of the separation of powers. Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme
Court's distinction between legislative intent and statutory authority also
leads to the conclusion that the power granted to the RRC is a usurpation of
judicial power granted by the constitution.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND BEYOND: A
POLICY ANALYSIS

Professor Orth notes that "interpretation of the constitution may
'
involve considerations of public policy."193
Certainly, evaluation of the
authority granted to the RRC in the rulemaking process raises several
important public policy considerations. This Comment concludes, using
the criteria of independence and effectiveness to judge the rulemaking
process, that the current role of the RRC in the rulemaking process
represents unsound public policy.
A. Independence
Administrative rules must comport with legislative intent, but this
must not come at the expense of the under-enforcement of constitutional
norms. North Carolina needs a rulemaking process that is independent of
impermissible legislative control and that respects the "constitutional
restrictions on legislative oversight." '94 In this context, independence
embodies the notion of the principle of separation of powers.
Independence ensures that rulemaking decisions are based on the discretion
and expertise of agencies, and that regulatory programs are implemented in
a coherent manner, without interruption and interference by the General
Assembly. The independence of each branch of the government functions
to protect the liberty of the citizen and to limit the potential for the abuse of
power by the different branches of the government. 95 The current role of
the RRC in the rulemaking process involves serious public policy
implications regarding the importance of the separation of powers and the
ability of each branch of the government to carry out its constitutionally
mandated responsibilities independent of the other branches.
The separation of powers serves several goals. First, the separation of
powers prevents the concentration of power in any one branch of the
government. Such a concentration of power in one branch is understood
193. See Orth, supra note 96, at 26.
194. See Rossi, supra note 71, at 563.
195. See Orth, supra note 96, at 1.
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historically as the root of tyranny. Second, the separation of powers
provides each branch of the government with weapons to fight off
encroachment by the other two branches, in the constitutionally prescribed
system of checks and balances. The idea that concentrated, unchecked
political power is a danger to civil liberties and to popular rights remains91 a6
persistent and characteristic feature of American constitutionalism.
Accordingly, maintaining separate and distinct branches of government,
and taking care to ensure that each branch operates independently of the
others, are necessary to protect our basic freedoms.
To avoid undermining the policy served by the doctrine of separation
of powers, the General Assembly should not be empowered to interfere in
the rulemaking process. Administrative law and agency action pervade
modern society, and will only become more pervasive as the population of
the state continues to grow rapidly.'9 7 Agencies must be allowed the
flexibility and discretion to address the growing complexities of our society
in order "to improve our community and to protect our personal
liberties."' 9 8 Agencies should be free to adopt regulatory programs tailored
under agency expertise and knowledge and should not be hampered in
adopting coherent regulatory schemes by unconstitutional interference from
the General Assembly. Eliminating the role of the RRC in the rulemaking
process and thus removing the potential for legislative interference may
decrease the likelihood that rules comport with legislative intent; however,
North Carolina needs a rulemaking process that is independent from the
control of the General Assembly, one that adheres to the important doctrine
of the separation of powers in order to minimize political divisiveness and
to maximize the protection of civil liberties and public well-being.
Removing the RRC from the process would allow agencies to formulate
regulatory approaches they find best suited to address their particular
problems; should the regulatory approach deviate significantly from the
intent of the General Assembly, the General Assembly could pass a bill, via
the legislative process mandated by the constitution, which does away with
the rule.
B.

Effectiveness

At the same time, North Carolina needs an effective rulemaking
process that ensures -that rules comport with legislative intent but that does
not paralyze agencies in their rulemaking efforts or require an inordinate

196.
197.
1997, at
198.

See id.
See Thomas R. West, The Chair's Comments, ADMIN. LAW. (N.C. Bar Ass'n), Nov.
1-2.
See id. at 2.
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delay in the time required for a rule to become operative. An effective
rulemaking process is important because in order to fulfill their
responsibilities to the citizens of the state, administrative agencies must be
free to implement rules according to their expertise and in a timely manner.
The current role of the RRC in the rulemaking process raises concern about
the potential for the RRC to succumb to political pressure and to object to
agency rules on ideological grounds.
This concern is best illustrated by the recent lawsuits filed by the
EMC and state environmental conservation groups.
As stated, the
pervasiveness of administrative regulation is increasing as society grows
and becomes increasingly complex.'99 Concurrently, the burdens on the
regulated community are increasing as well, which motivates the regulated
community to become more involved in the political process to protect its
own interests. The discretion afforded to the RRC in reviewing rules is
disturbing because the criteria by which the RRC evaluates rules are vague,
and the troubling potential exists of the RRC succumbing to the political
pressure from powerful special interest groups. For example, the RRC is
not subject to restrictions on lobbying or ex parte contacts that normally
apply to administrative agencies.2"' Critics of the RRC's role in the
rulemaking process contend that the RRC abused its authority to veto
controversial rules in response to political opposition to the rules. For
example, Professor Rossi points out that:
In July 1996 the [RRC] vetoed wetlands rules proposed by the state
Environmental Management Commission because the [RRC]
thought the rules were vague and that the agency was without the
statutory authority to adopt them, despite the state Attorney
General's opinion to the contrary. More recently, the [RRC] vetoed
a certificate-of-need process for open-heart surgery centers, opposed
by large health care interests in the state, and rules restricting sewage
from hogs, opposed by the strong farming interests in the state. In
both instances, representatives of those interests opposed to the rules
made political appeals directly to the [RRC]. 20'
The allegations contained in the lawsuits filed by the EMC and by
state environmental conservation organizations are analogous to those
199. See West, supra note 195, at 1-2.
200. See Rossi, supra note 71, at 563. In general, ex parte contacts are any written or verbal
communication, initiated outside of a duly noticed public hearing, between the official with
authority and one or more parties involved, but not necessarily all interested parties, related to
subject matter which is being considered by that official. Ex parte contacts are dangerous in that
they may influence the official's consideration of the subject matter. The lack of statutory
restriction seems to indicate that the members of the RRC may be subject to such influence
through ex parte contacts.
201. See Rossi, supra note 71, at 563.

2004]

N. C. RULES REVIEW COMMISSION

2123

contended by Professor Rossi.2" 2
The potential for the RRC to succumb to political pressure is
problematic because it contradicts the reasons for delegating the
implementation of laws to administrative agencies. The implementation of
laws is delegated to administrative agencies because the agencies possess
the requisite expertise, knowledge, and human capital to address the
complex and technical conditions created by modem society. Succumbing
to political pressure represents a complete disregard for the recognized fact
that agencies are best suited to formulate rules and regulations, and raises
troubling implications for the level of protection afforded to public health,
safety, and welfare. North Carolina needs a rulemaking process that is
effective, one that ensures that agencies are not paralyzed in their
rulemaking efforts by the political power of special interest groups and
lobbying organizations, and one that maximizes protection of public health,
safety, and welfare.
Another critical component of an effective rulemaking process is the
ability of agency regulatory programs to become operative in a timely
manner. As mentioned above, it may take as long as eighteen months for
controversial rules to take effect.2 °3 This protracted timeline is troubling
for several reasons. The delay is a disservice to the regulated community
and to the general public regarding the various public health, safety, and
welfare problems addressed by agency action. The agencies are stripped of
the ability to act with any degree of exigency in addressing such problems.
Rules pending under review may even be rendered useless as conditions,
technology, or scientific understanding may change. New circumstances
may arise in the eighteen months it takes for a rule to become operative.
Additionally, the lag creates confusion for the regulated community as its
members can never be certain whether and when rules will become
operative. North Carolina needs a rulemaking process that is designed to
allow the maximum amount of agency flexibility and discretion in
addressing the various conditions necessitating regulation, and that allows
agencies to respond to these conditions in a timely manner to ensure that
protection of public health, safety, and welfare is maximized. As one critic
of the current role of the RRC has written:
Agencies may gladly live under budget scrutiny and the potential of
statutory change, and are quite comfortable with the fact that the
legislature as a body can strike any rule at any time. The pocket
delay, however, strains the notions of democratic government and
202. See supra note 2 (outlining the contours of the lawsuits filed alleging that the RRC has

an unconstitutional grant of authority).
203. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 1.
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Removing the RRC from the rulemaking process may mean that rules
are more likely to deviate from legislative intent. However, the removal of
the RRC from the rulemaking process will allow agencies to enact
regulatory schemes that are best suited to address the problems at hand, not
merely the schemes that are the most politically appealing, and will allow
the agency to do so in reasonable time.
Thus, public policy implications suggest that the current role of the
RRC in the rulemaking process poses several different threats that must be
balanced against the RRC's purpose of ensuring that rules comport with
legislative intent." 5 This Comment takes the position that the potential for
slight deviation from legislative intent is outweighed by the need for the
separation of powers and respect for agency expertise.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The North Carolina judiciary has respected the principle of the
separation of powers for over two hundred years. 6 While the increasing
complexity of modem society necessitates some flexibility in the
coordination between the branches of the government, this coordination
must be implemented in a fashion confined by constitutional limitations, in
order to prevent the usurpation of power of one branch of the government
from another. With this in mind, the RRC should be completely removed
from the rulemaking process. State agencies, charged with the duty of
implementing the law, should be free to promulgate rules and regulations
based on their own expertise and decisionmaking processes without fear of
paralysis by the RRC, potentially based on ideological objections or
objections resulting from the political pressure brought to bear on the RRC
by powerful special interests. It is in the best interests of the public welfare
for agencies to promulgate rules and regulations based on the expertise and
skill that each agency possesses and.not based on political interjections
made by the RRC or the legislative branch of the government.
Those frustrated by the rulemaking process in North Carolina contend
that state agency rulemaking has created a bureaucratic and economic
nightmare for the regulated community.2 7 The crux of this problem lies
not with the agencies and the rulemaking process but with legislation
enacted by the General Assembly that imposes greater restriction on people
204. See Payne, supra note 3, at 796.
205. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 1 (pointing out that the purpose served by the RRC is
legislative review).
206. See discussion supra Part ll.A.
207. See Faires, supra note 1, at 1.
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and businesses, and directs agencies to create rules and regulations in order
to implement the legislation. 2°8 The regulated community should pressure
the General Assembly to address their grievances by enacting legislation
that responds to the needs of the regulated community as opposed to
enacting legislation that necessitates further administrative regulation. In
this way, the General Assembly could address the situation of
over-regulation through its own constitutional means as opposed to
interfering with the ability of the administrative agencies to do their jobs in
executing the law.
For several years, the Administrative Law Section of the North
Carolina Bar Association has been involved in the task of reforming the
rulemaking procedures set forth in the NCAPA.2 °9 After multiple meetings
and re-writes, a draft bill was approved by the Administrative Law Section
and was considered for inclusion in the Bar Association's legislative
package for the General Assembly's 2003 session.1 0 Several provisions
were well-received by the General Assembly and were adopted as
amendments to the NCAPA, taking effect in August 2003 .21 The efforts of
the Administrative Law Section, unfortunately, do not address the
fundamental constitutional issues raised by the participation of the RRC in
the rulemaking process. Reforms such as the elimination of the RRC from
the rulemaking process were "discarded as unproductive" during the course
of discussion.21 2 The reform efforts focused instead on measures developed
to shorten the rulemaking timetable and to eliminate some of the
cumbersome processes for rules that were deemed to be
"non-controversial."2 13
While the proposals of the Administrative Law Section may mitigate
some of the frustration with the rulemaking process, they simultaneously
acquiesce to the usurpation of executive power and of judicial power by the
General Assembly. If there is continued disregard for the constitutional
implications of the RRC and continued expansion of the RRC's role in the
rulemaking process, the line between creating the laws and implementing
the laws will become increasingly blurred. The under-enforcement of
constitutional norms is a troubling phenomenon with even more troubling
208. See id. at 10.
209. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 1, 3.
210. See id. at 3.
211. Those provisions include the mechanism for distinguishing between controversial and
non-controversial rules; the establishment of a rolling deadline for review of controversial rules
by the General Assembly; the formalization of the different categories of emergency and
temporary rules; the subjection of temporary rules to review by the RRC. Each of these
provisions is described in detail in Part I of this Comment.
212. See Fountain, supra note 4, at 3.
213. See id.
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consequences. The balance of powers will be tipped even more heavily in
favor of the legislative branch, jeopardizing not only the integrity of the
other branches of the government but the liberty of the citizens which the
separation of powers is designed to protect.
As this analysis points out, many states with constitutions that, like
North Carolina's, declare expressly that the powers of the government shall
be separate and distinct, have eliminated the power of the legislative branch
to paralyze agency rulemaking on the basis of its constitutional
implications. For example, in Kentucky the Administration Regulation
Review Subcommittee, after its power to veto agency rules was declared to
be unconstitutional by the Kentucky Supreme Court, is now authorized to
make only non-binding determinations in its review of agency rules.2" 4
The Joint
North Carolina should follow Kentucky's example.
("JLAPOC"),
Oversight
Committee
Procedure
Administrative
Legislative
organized pursuant to Section 120-70.100 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, provides sufficient legislative oversight of the rulemaking
procedure to ensure that regulatory programs are operating as intended by
their enabling statutory authority and to keep the General Assembly abreast
of the current state of administrative agencies. The JLAPOC, unlike the
RRC, is not empowered to veto proposed agency rules or to determine
whether proposed rules exceed the enabling statutory authority. Instead,
this committee merely gathers information regarding state regulatory
programs, existing rules, and the rulemaking process, serving as a focal
point for legislative inspection of state regulatory agencies and the rules
they propose. The JLAPOC should stand in place of the RRC and function
to inform the General Assembly as to the state of the regulatory agencies in
order to preserve the constitutionally mandated distinctions between the
branches of the government. Limiting legislative oversight to this body
would also dramatically reduce the time required for a rule to be placed
into effect.
CONCLUSION
The state of the administrative rulemaking process in North Carolina
is a veritable nightmare from the standpoint of the regulated and the
regulators alike. Though there have been many amendments to the
NCAPA in an attempt to improve the state of administrative regulation,
repeated increases in power granted to the RRC have done little to temper
the frustration caused by the rulemaking process. This Comment has
argued that the RRC, the body created by the General Assembly to limit the
amount of administrative regulation that is imposed upon the people of
214. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13A.030(2) (2000).
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North Carolina and to "improve" the regulatory process from the
perspective of the regulated community, is an egregious violation of the
separation of powers doctrine and is thus an unconstitutional attempt to
reform the rulemaking process. This Comment, taking the position that the
RRC is a legislative body, has focused on two possible legal challenges to
the constitutionality of the RRC: first, the interference by the legislature
with the responsibilities constitutionally reserved for the executive branch,
and second, interference by the legislature with the responsibilities
constitutionally reserved for the judiciary. Additionally, this Comment
contends that the role of the RRC in the rulemaking process represents
unsound public policy. Research of federal issues and of analogous
situations that have arisen in other states suggests the authority granted to
the RRC would be unconstitutional, based on the argument that the
functions of the RRC interfere with the powers constitutionally reserved to
the executive branch.
North Carolina's tradition of a strict adherence to the separation of
powers doctrine and relatively formalistic approach to constitutional
jurisprudence demonstrates the commitment of the state's citizens to
respect the exclusive jurisdiction of each distinct branch of government.
With the successive adoption of each of three constitutions, the people of
North Carolina have made clear that the separation of powers is the
cornerstone of their state government. The attempts of the legislative
branch to paralyze the constitutional mandate of the executive branchimplementation of laws of the state-represent an egregious disruption of
the balance of powers to which the people of North Carolina have been
committed throughout the entire history of the state. This balance will be
properly realigned only when the RRC is removed from the administrative
rulemaking process entirely and the state agencies are free to carry out the
implementation of the laws without interference by the General Assembly.
The current state of agency regulation in North Carolina leaves little room
to doubt that the process must be reformed. One thing is certain:
increasing the presence and the potency of the RRC within the process
cannot be the answer.
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